Every answer and its explanation appears here once you have finished the path. Each one then links to the matching glossary entry, where the concept is set out in full with its worked example.
1. Discharged on March 4, held by customs on the 19th. The cargo policy expires sixty days after discharge, the political risk policy deems deprivation total after six continuous months, and the goods lose their market value in eight to ten weeks. Where is the trap?
In the GAP between the three clocks: cargo cover dies on May 3, deprivation will not be deemed total until September 19, and the goods will be worthless in early May. There is therefore a four and a half month window with no cover, on goods that will already have stopped being worth anything
The three periods are each reasonable and their combination is not, which is the usual shape of this kind of gap: nobody intended it and yet it is written. The proposal counting the remaining forty five days does the right calculation on the wrong question, since what is missing is not time at the start but cover in the middle. The one challenging the sixty day clause attacks a market practice that has its reason, a cargo policy not being a storage policy. The one setting market value aside is right on the distinction and misses that it is market value that sets the real deadline for action, before either cover.
Glossary entry · facultes-marchandises-cargo2. The cargo policy excludes confiscation by a government. How should that exclusion be read?
Not as an OVERSIGHT but as a MARKET BOUNDARY: it says this peril belongs to the political risk market and not to the transport market, and the gap lodges exactly on it when the two policies do not speak to each other
Reading an exclusion as a boundary rather than as a deprivation changes conduct: one does not challenge it, one goes looking for the other policy and checks that the two overlap in time. The proposal limiting it to permanent appropriation is the most attractive and it is dangerous, because it suggests cover during the hold when the cargo policy will have expired on the sixtieth day anyway. The one conditioning it on the lawfulness of the measure imports a distinction that counts in the political risk file and that the cargo market does not draw. The one calling it merely negotiable misses that a market does not willingly sell another market's risk.
Glossary entry · assurance-marine3. The sale is on terms where risk passes at shipment, and the buyer was to pay sixty days after delivery. Who holds the insurable interest at the moment of the hold?
The BUYER, because it is the SALE TERMS and not the policy that say so: risk passed at shipment, so the held goods are its own, and the seller holds only a RECEIVABLE. What the seller insures is no longer goods, it is an unpaid debt
That shift decides everything else: a seller that believes it is defending goods is in the wrong file, and its own is an unpaid debt file whose proof of cause lies elsewhere. The proposal leaving ownership with the seller until payment confuses the transfer of RISK, which the sale terms govern, with a retention of title clause, which may exist and is a separate stipulation. The one sharing the interest in proportion to price describes a mechanism that does not exist and has the shape of what one would wish for. The one subrogating the cargo insurer anticipates an effect that presupposes indemnification, which will not occur since the peril is excluded.
Glossary entry · interet-assurable4. The exporter wants to file immediately for a total loss under the political risk policy. What is raised against it?
That a HOLD IS NOT A LOSS: deprivation only becomes total after a CONTINUOUS PERIOD, six months here, and it is during that period that the goods degrade and nobody pays. The filing is made now, the indemnification cannot be
The distinction between filing and being paid is what saves this file: one files early to preserve the deadline and the evidence, one knows settlement will wait, and one acts meanwhile on the goods rather than on the contract. The proposal calling the filing premature is the costliest error here, because it lets the period in which documents can be obtained slip by. The one requiring destruction or permanent appropriation describes another cover's regime and ignores the continuous deprivation clause, which exists precisely for this case. The one deferring to a cargo survey relies on a market that has excluded the peril and therefore has no reason to survey.
Glossary entry · risque-politique5. What is the March 19 administrative decision worth, beyond the blockage it produces?
It is ALSO THE DOCUMENT proving the POLITICAL CAUSE OF THE NON PAYMENT: the buyer is not paying because the state suspended imports in its sector, and that is written in a dated act of authority. That file waits for no six month period and is built at once
This is the module's useful reversal: the document that creates the problem on one policy is the one that resolves the other file, and the second does not run on the same clocks. Where deprivation of the goods takes six months, the cause of the non payment is proven the same day, and the exporter left holding only a receivable is exactly who that serves. The proposal reserving it for the cargo file forgets that this market has excluded the peril. The one using it to quantify works a real but secondary use, which assumes the principle settled. The one deriving immunity from it invents an effect and shifts the discussion toward a claim against the state, when the debtor is the buyer.
Glossary entry · immunite-souveraine