Contingent commission
Remuneration paid to a broker according to the volume or profitability of business placed, creating an interest in steering the client to one insurer rather than another.
In October 2004 New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer sued Marsh over contingent commissions and sham quotes; the January 2005 settlement cost the broker $850 million paid back to clients. A contingent commission is paid by the insurer to the broker on the overall performance of the book placed, volume, profitability or renewal rate, rather than contract by contract. It is economically defensible, since it rewards a quality of selection that benefits both sides. It also sets up a structural conflict of interest, the broker being the policyholder's agent while paid by the insurer on criteria the policyholder does not know. The conflict becomes a breach once placement stops following the client's interest. The answer was disclosure rather than prohibition. The large brokers gave these commissions up in 2005, then the New York agreements were amended in 2010 and the practice came back. In Europe, Article 19 of the Insurance Distribution Directive requires the client to be told the nature of the remuneration. Disclosure a client does not read corrects no conflict, and conduct regulators now look at the value actually delivered.
The investigation opened in 2004 by the New York Attorney General against the broker Marsh, concerning contingent commissions and bid rigging, was settled in January 2005 with an agreement to pay $850 million to clients and with the major global brokers abandoning such payments.
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