Skip to content
←Back to glossaryInfrastructure & data centers

Suspected sabotage of a submarine cable

Its 7 cross-references, woven across the glossary's 18 categories

Severing of an undersea telecommunications cable by a vessel dragging its anchor, under circumstances that raise suspicion of a deliberate act rather than a navigation accident.

Definition

Suspected sabotage of a submarine cable refers to the severing of an undersea telecommunications cable resting on the seabed, most often through a vessel's anchor being dragged along its route for an extended stretch, under trajectory or duration circumstances that make an accidental explanation hard to sustain. Unlike accidental damage, rare but already covered by cable operators' existing policies, this peril combines an ordinary property loss with a question of state attribution that largely escapes the usual tools of insurance: identifying a vessel's flag and owner is not enough to establish a link to a sponsoring state, for lack of evidence that would meet the standard required under international law. For the infrastructure's insurer, the economic consequence goes beyond the cost of repairing the cable itself, measured in weeks of a cable-laying ship's time, and extends to the loss of international connectivity for the operators and end customers who depended on it, over links that are often redundant but not always enough to absorb several simultaneous cuts. The risk takes on a new dimension as global traffic concentrates on a small number of strategic cables, each carrying a growing share of intercontinental connectivity.

Example

On October 8, 2023, the C-Lion1 telecommunications cable linking Finland and Germany and the Balticconnector gas pipeline were damaged simultaneously in the Baltic Sea, with the Finnish investigation pointing to the anchor of the Chinese container ship Newnew Polar Bear having been dragged over dozens of kilometers of seabed.

Related terms
Stay informed

Follow the research

One letter a week. First, the week's underwriting note, when one is published: a dated, argued decision, signed by Paul Bernardski. Then what the observatory published on cyber risk, political risk and insurance. No account, no tracking.

No spam, one-click unsubscribe, no data ever sold.