Air gap
Physical separation of a system or backup from any connected network, putting it out of reach of remote attack; strong protection, but one that can be bypassed through removable media or poorly controlled maintenance.
An air-gapped system has no connection, direct or indirect, with the internet or the corporate network. No remote attack can reach it. The principle applies to two main uses. Backups first: a copy of data kept offline, on tape or a disconnected disk, survives ransomware that encrypts everything it can reach, including online backups. It is one of the three copies in the classic backup rule, and cyber insurers explicitly ask for it. Industrial and sensitive systems next: control networks of critical installations, military systems, research environments. Isolation is never absolute, however. The Stuxnet attack crossed a nuclear facility's air gap via USB sticks, and maintenance, updates and contractors' laptops create temporary bridges. Many industrial networks thought isolated actually have forgotten connections for remote maintenance. Isolation also has a cost: it makes backups slower to restore, and isolated systems harder to update. For the underwriter, the useful question is not whether the system is isolated, but how the isolation is verified and how data gets into it.
Discovered in June 2010, Stuxnet reached Iran's Natanz enrichment plant, whose control network was not connected to the internet, through USB drives and contractors' computers. The Institute for Science and International Security estimated that about 1,000 centrifuges there were taken out of service between late 2009 and early 2010.
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