Texas City refinery explosion (2005)

Texas City, Texas, March 23, 2005, 1:20 p.m. As the isomerization unit of the BP refinery restarts, the raffinate splitter column is filled past its level. Operators do not see it: the level indicator is faulty, the high-level alarm does not sound. Relief valves open and send the liquid to a blowdown drum whose stack vents straight to the atmosphere, with no flare; the drum overfills in turn, and the product rains down around the stack and forms a cloud. An idling pickup truck nearby provides ignition. The explosion kills fifteen people, all contractors in trailers sited too close to the unit, and injures a hundred and eighty. The document that counts is the US Chemical Safety Board report: it describes a site where maintenance had been trimmed and where process safety warnings were not escalated. For insurance the loss reads in several layers. Property damage and business interruption under the refiner's industrial policy, liability to contractors' employees and residents, fines and remediation outside cover. The market drew a lesson on building siting: policies and surveys have since asked about the distance between work trailers and process units. The case is the first one cited to illustrate a downstream loss, with Buncefield.