Greensill Capital collapse (2021)
The March 2021 collapse of a supply chain finance lender whose entire funding rested on trade credit insurance that the insurer declined to renew.
On March 1, 2021, Credit Suisse froze four supply chain finance funds of about 10 billion dollars, fed almost entirely by Greensill Capital. The same day, a New South Wales court refused Greensill the injunction it had sought to keep its trade credit insurance policies in force; they had expired, and they covered several billion dollars of receivables. On March 8, the company went into administration in London. The structure ran on reverse factoring: Greensill paid a large client's suppliers early, the client repaid at maturity, and the receivables, packaged into notes, were sold to the funds. Credit insurance on the notes did the rest; it earned them a rating and comforted investors who were buying a product sold as very safe. With no insurer, there was no issuance and no refinancing, and a firm that lived on rolling its notes stopped within days. Greensill's largest client was GFG Alliance, Sanjeev Gupta's group of steelworks and aluminum plants, with exposure in the order of 5 billion dollars. Part of the notes rested on future receivables, sales GFG expected to make to buyers, some of whom said they had never dealt with it. A receivable that does not exist has no obligor, and a non-payment policy has nothing to pay. The insurer, for its part, disputed policies written by an employee of the Australian underwriting agency BCC (Bond & Credit Co.), a Tokio Marine subsidiary, beyond his delegated authority. In May 2021 the Serious Fraud Office opened an investigation into GFG, including its financing from Greensill; in February 2023 FINMA found that Credit Suisse had seriously breached its supervisory obligations in the matter. In Bremen, BaFin had already imposed a moratorium on Greensill Bank, the German subsidiary, on March 3, closing it to customers, and filed for its insolvency on March 15; municipalities held deposits there that the deposit guarantee scheme did not cover.
Textbook case on the mechanics: a supplier invoices 1,000,000 euros at 120 days. On day ten, the financier pays it 990,000 euros and takes over the receivable; the buyer will pay 1,000,000 at maturity. The 10,000 euro discount over 110 days comes to 10,000 / 990,000 = 1.01%, about 3.35% a year. The fund that buys the note backed by the receivable earns that yield, and the credit insurance policy promises it payment if the buyer defaults. If the receivable stems from a sale that never took place, the buyer owes nothing: the note is worth only what the issuer is worth.
Greensill collapse, Greensill Capital, Credit Suisse supply chain finance funds, Greensill and GFG Alliance
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