AIS manipulation
Switching off or falsifying the signal by which a ship broadcasts its position and identity, used to conceal illicit activity, notably sanctions evasion; it has become an underwriting and compliance criterion.
The Automatic Identification System, mandatory under the SOLAS convention for merchant ships of a certain size on international voyages, continuously broadcasts the ship's position, speed, course and identity. Designed to prevent collisions, it has become the main source for tracking world shipping. Its manipulation takes several forms. The ship may switch off its transmitter, known as going dark, during a discreet ship-to-ship transfer at sea. It may broadcast a false position, hundreds of kilometers from its real one, to fake an innocuous route while loading at a sanctioned port. Or it may borrow another ship's identity, sometimes of a vessel scrapped long ago. These practices are at the heart of the shadow fleet carrying Russian, Iranian or Venezuelan oil in evasion of sanctions. US and UK authorities have issued advisories making them red flags for all maritime players, insurers included. For insurance, the consequences are twofold. Covering a ship that manipulates its signal exposes the insurer to sanctions breaches, hence analysis of voyage histories before underwriting. And a ship sailing without a signal raises the risk of collision, grounding and pollution without a solvent insurer.
Hypothetical case: before renewing cover on a tanker, a P&I club analyzes its last twelve months of voyages. It finds three signal gaps of more than forty-eight hours off a sanctioned port; it declines renewal and reports the ship to the sanctions authority.
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