Estlink 2 cut and the Eagle S case (2024)
Cut of the Estlink 2 power cable between Finland and Estonia and four telecom cables on December 25, 2024. Finland boarded the Eagle S, a tanker suspected of dragging its anchor.
On December 25, 2024, around midday, Estlink 2, the 650 megawatt direct current subsea power link between Finland and Estonia, went down. Four telecom cables in the Gulf of Finland were damaged within the same hours. The next day, the Finnish coast guard boarded the Eagle S, a Cook Islands-flagged tanker carrying Russian products, which European authorities tie to the shadow fleet that gets around the oil price cap. Its anchor was missing; a drag mark ran for dozens of kilometers along the seabed. NATO launched Baltic Sentry on January 14, 2025. Finnish prosecutors charged the captain and two officers, and the Helsinki District Court declined jurisdiction on October 3, 2025, since the events took place in the exclusive economic zone, outside territorial waters. The Helsinki Court of Appeal overturned that ruling in late summer 2026 and reopened the case, a decision that can still go to the Supreme Court. For insurance, the case ticks every box of the gray zone. A merchant ship, not a warship, damage with no claim of responsibility, an intent no court has established. Repairing the cable took months. Does the damage fall under the shipowner's liability and its P&I club, a malicious act, or a hybrid operation that war exclusions take out? Each policy answers in its own words, and none of them says "anchor".
Hypothetical: an Estonian power supplier that imported through Estlink 2 buys at spot prices during the months of repair. It claims the lost margin under its property and business interruption policy, as contingent business interruption. The insurer replies that the cable belongs neither to the insured nor to a named supplier, and that utility failure is excluded without a specific extension.
Estlink 2, Eagle S, Eagle S case, Estlink 2 outage
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